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Clausewitz believed that war and politics are inseparable—that the grim realities of war 
are just a continuation of the laborious machinations of politics. This relationship is 
always complicated. States are rarely able to achieve the complete destruction of their 
foes, settling instead on using their military might to achieve limited political ends. When 
political goals are pursued by inappropriate or ill-considered military means, disaster may 
easily result. For the United States 30 years ago, the decision to send combat troops into 
Lebanon in an ambiguous, peacekeeping role tragically illustrates one such disaster. This 
thesis examines the U.S. intervention in Lebanon from 1982–1984 to historically analyze 
U.S. policy and strategy and illustrate the disparities between the strategic goals of the 
administration and the methods employed to achieve them. These events mark the 
beginning of direct U.S. military intervention in the post-colonial Middle East, a process 
that has grown steadily in scale and consequence ever since. Despite the accumulation of 
such hard-won experience in the region, the harmonization of military means and 
political ends remains as illusive today as it was at the start. 
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I. HOW IT ALL BEGAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Famed military theoretician Carl Von Clausewitz believed that war and politics 
are inseparable—that the grim realities of war are just a continuation of the laborious 
machinations of politics.1 This relationship is always complicated. States are rarely able 
to achieve the complete destruction of their foes, settling instead on using their military 
might to achieve limited political ends. When political goals are pursued by inappropriate 
or ill-considered military means, disaster may easily result. For the United States 30 years 
ago, the decision to send combat troops into Lebanon in an ambiguous, peacekeeping role 
tragically illustrates one such disaster. These events mark the beginning of direct U.S. 
military intervention in the post-colonial Middle East, a process that has grown steadily 
in scale and consequence ever since.  
Following swiftly on the heels of the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in June 
of 1982, the United States attempted to seize an opportunity to promote its salient 
interests in the region through aggressive diplomatic and military intervention. U.S. 
politico-military involvement was meant to bolster the battered Lebanese government 
against insurgent forces, secure the withdrawal of all foreign fighters, and rekindle the 
Arab-Israeli peace process for the combative Lebanese and Palestinians, which could 
have resulted in extensive positive changes for the tone of the entire region.2 
Unfortunately, U.S. intercession in Lebanon did not advance progressive change for any 
involved. 
Militants seized Lebanon’s capital by January of 1984 and demanded the 
withdrawal of allied forces.3 By February, the intervention was over. At the cost of 
hundreds of allied lives, considerable U.S. diplomatic pressure, and significant economic 
                                                 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans.  Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 87. 
2 Ralph A. Hallenbeck, Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Intervention in 
Lebanon, August 1982–February 1984 (New York: Praeger, 1991), xi. 
3 Ibid., 124. 
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and military assistance, the United States’ attempts to manage the Lebanese crisis 
generated long-lasting results that ran completely counter to its strategic goals. Several 
factors contributed to U.S. failure: marked lack of synergy between U.S. foreign policy 
and strategy,4 ambiguity over exactly what the U.S. hoped to accomplish and how it 
sought to do so, and finally, the unresolved question as to whether military forces should 
have been used in an attempt to obtain limited objectives that did not have clear 
indicators of success. 
Despite the accumulation of such hard-won experience in the region, the 
harmonization of military means and political ends remains as illusive today as it was at 
the start. For the U.S. in Lebanon, a synergy of ends and means never occurred and the 
results were unnecessarily crippling to U.S.-led attempts at peace in the Middle East. In 
the following sections, context for the intervention is provided, policy and strategy for the 
participants is outlined, and the results of U.S. actions are analyzed. These historical 
aspects are studied in order to glean how and why the U.S. intervention occurred and 
what lessons may be drawn from it that are relevant to the future of the United States in 
its dealings with the Middle East. 
B. RELEVANCE 
Conflict in the Middle East cannot be understood simply in terms of “X caused 
Y.” Religious and ethnic identities have historically clashed in the area and modern-era 
international politics only serves to exacerbate the endemic regional problems. The 
attempts made by Western powers to graft a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute onto a 
complex transnational backdrop in the middle of a limited and misunderstood struggle in 
Lebanon in 1982 further complicated the already existing regional issues.5 
Similar to other conflicts in the Middle East prior to 1982, the war in Lebanon 
was one of limited scope and objectives. All of the combatants engaged in Lebanon were 
                                                 
4 Strategy, in this case, is defined as the roles and objectives assigned to U.S. armed forces. 
5 Thomas M. Davis, “Lebanon 1982: The Imbalance of Political Ends and Military Means,” Global 
Security.org, accessed August 9, 2014, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/DTM.htm. 
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confined in space, time, and goals.6 For example, the United States did not attempt to 
occupy Lebanon in order to suppress the fighting via total war and mass mobilization; 
neither did the United States have access to the political freedom of maneuver required to 
do so. Ultimately, U.S. actions were not sufficiently tailored to make them achievable by 
the political and military forces brought to bear in the conflict. 
The previous point is exactly why an analysis of Lebanon in 1982 is still relevant 
today as a study in the modern use of force and diplomatic issues in the Middle East. The 
United States should have established political objectives that were clearly delineated and 
relatable in military terms if force was going to be used for strategic leverage, but this did 
not occur throughout the increasingly violent evolution of the conflict. Small-scale 
conventional forces were sent into a hostile environment with restrictive rules of 
engagement (ROE), ambiguous mission statements, and little to no guidance for 
operational execution in a politically sensitive region. The most puzzling aspect of the 
intervention was the incomplete, off-hand analysis that preceded and persisted throughout 
the United State’s involvement.7 
The costs associated with this strategic oversight were exorbitant and amounted to 
pervasive national and international damage control in the aftermath. The Reagan 
administration was subject to internal fragmentation that led to managerial chaos.8 
Congress and others reopened the debate of the president’s abuse of the War Powers Act 
of 1974. The U.S. image in the Middle East was irreparably damaged and the U.S.-Israeli 
relationship was altered, the repercussions of which are still felt today. The conflict itself 
cost nearly 300 American lives, drove Syria and others closer to the Soviet Union, and 
renewed questions in American politics regarding the appropriate role of U.S. forces in 
conflict. To this day, the Arab-Israeli dispute rages on with no clear resolution in sight.9 
                                                 
6 Thomas M. Davis, 40Km Into Lebanon: Israel’s 1982 Invasion (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 1985), 16. 
7 Hallenbeck, Military Force, 137–140. 
8 Ibid., 10. 
9 Davis, “Lebanon 1982: The Imbalance of Political Ends and Military Means.” 
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In order to understand the fundamental issues behind the war in Lebanon and the 
U.S. intervention, it is necessary to elaborate on the germane issues in Lebanese history 
that relate directly to the Arab-Israeli conflict. To do that, one must follow the rabbit hole 
down to an all-too-familiar place and back to where this story really began: the formation 
of Lebanon as a fragmented polity with an inherent disposition for violent sectarian 
turmoil displays how the state was seemingly fated to become the battlefield for the 
Israeli and Palestinian struggle.10 
C. A BRIEF HISTORY 
Although conflict and foreign power intervention have occurred in Lebanon as far 
back as Roman times, modern Lebanon is ultimately a creation of the same political 
process that created Syria, Turkey, Israel, Jordan,11 and others.12 Post-WWI, the 
responsibility of dividing the Middle East regions previously held by the Ottoman Empire 
fell to France and England as victors’ spoils at the conclusion of the bloody European 
conflict’s conclusion.13 The secret wartime collusion known as the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement ensured that the northern Levant comprised of southeastern Turkey, Syria, 
and Lebanon was apportioned to France’s dominion while Transjordan, Iraq, and 
Palestine/Israel went to the British.14 See Figure 1 for the regional divisions of Lebanon 






                                                 
10 Davis, 40Km Into Lebanon, 53. 
11 “Transjordan” at its founding. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 55. 




Figure 1.  Lebanon and Syria under the Ottomans15 
Based on historical connections between France and the northern Levant region, 
the French were officially placed in command of Lebanese and Syrian reformations 
through a mandate obtained in the League of Nations in April 1920. The provisional 
mandate directed that the French guide the populations to self-determination and report 
progress regularly to the League.16 Although the region was supposed to be ruled as 
separate but equal parts of a larger political body, French leaders ultimately sought to 
weaken Muslim influence in the region, specifically Syrian influence.17  
France immediately began shuffling the geopolitical building blocks into separate 
“statelets,” based primarily on religious representation. The French took steps to divide 
Lebanon from Syria in order to ensure continued reliance on French power in the region 
by Maronite Christians, the dominant faction in Lebanese society and the French-
appointed provisional administrative council.18 As one can see in Figure 2, the British-
French allocations completely disregarded the Ottoman’s previous administrative 
districts; however, for better or worse, the basis for modern Lebanon was established.  
                                                 
15 From Lewis, “Greater Syria and the Challenge to Syrian Nationalism.” 
16 William Harris, Lebanon: A History 600 – 2011 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 170. 
17 Ibid., 175–177. 
18 Davis, 40Km Into Lebanon, 56. 
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Figure 2.  Lebanon and Syria under the French19 
The borders drawn by France would have long-lasting implications. The final 
dimensions of the new country included the greater Mount Lebanon region, dividing the 
country in half between the population-heavy coast to the west and the fertile Bekaa 
Valley to the east, with the Anti-Lebanon mountain range forming a natural barrier to 
Syria (see Figure 3). It is important to note that France established the Lebanon-Syrian 
border out of territory that had belonged to the province of Damascus for hundreds of 
years, and was historically more attached to Damascus than Beirut by culture and 
influence.20 Redrawing the maps doubled the territory under the control of Lebanon at 
the expense of Syria and profoundly altered Lebanese demographics, which is 
exceedingly important when one considers Lebanon’s system of governance. 
                                                 
19 From Lewis, “Greater Syria and the Challenge to Syrian Nationalism.” 




Figure 3.  Modern Lebanon geographic map (from “Geographic Map of Lebanon,” 
accessed November 19, 2014, 
http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/greater-syria-and-the-
challenge-to-syrian-nationalism).  
The Lebanese constitution, co-written with the French in 1926, institutionalized 
the already ensconced principles of a confessional system of governance with 
representation based on religious divisions in the population. Confessional government 
meant that parliamentary seats (spread across the executive, legislative, and civil services 
sectors of the body politic) were to be distributed equally based on census data obtained 
in 1922. Maronite Christians were undoubtedly the majority group at the time; however, 
the data obtained indicated that their majority declined dramatically courtesy of the 
annexation of larger Muslim population areas into the new country. In 1922, the 
population estimates showed a Christian majority of 55 percent (down from 80 percent in 
1911 before the annexation) with Maronites comprising 33 percent of all Christians. 
Sunni and Shia Muslims increased from 3.5 to 20 percent and 5.6 to 17.2 percent, 
respectively.21 A second census, conducted in 1932, found the Maronite majority had 
decreased further, from one-third to 29 percent with Muslims rising 5 percent in total.22 
A rising Muslim population seemed to threaten the Maronite hold on political 
representation and ensured that Lebanon would never have a “clear” majority.23 France 
continued to administer Lebanon’s growth until its downfall in 1940. 
                                                 
21 Harris, Lebanon: A History, 178. 
22 Ibid., 185. 
23 There has not been another official census conducted in Lebanon since 1932. 
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With the fall of France to Germany in WWII, another great power stepped in to 
oversee Lebanon’s development. Between 1941 and 1943, the British consolidated 
disparate interests between Maronite and Muslim leaders into a shared interest in 
independence known as the National Pact.24 The spirit of the brokered deal was that 
Christians had to accept Lebanon as a part of the Arab world alongside Sunni and Shia 
political partners while the non-Christians had to accept Maronite presidential leadership 
and a Lebanon that also had interests facing West. The National Pact of 1943 was 
envisioned as paving the way for a Lebanon free of French meddling and balanced 
between the Christian and Muslim elites’ interests.25 Through the benefit of hindsight, 
this was clearly a set-up for future schismatic conflict. 
The National Pact finalized modern Lebanon’s divisions along sectarian lines, 
though the former constitutional requirements for proportional representation were 
slightly redefined. Per the agreement, the President of Lebanon would always be a 
Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the House of 
Parliament a Shiite. Within the House, for every five Muslim representatives appointed, 
there would be six Christian representatives. The president was to be elected directly by 
the Parliament.26  
The obvious problem with the confessional system, and the source of the 
inevitable future friction, was that the ratio used for proportional representation was 
based on faulty and outdated demographic data. Evidence suggests that Christians and 
Muslims were on par in terms of population by the early 1940s.27 Also, there were no 
requirements for the representation system to be readdressed within the National Pact; the 
constitution gave the President of Lebanon veto power over any legislation produced by 
the Parliament, ensuring that the distribution ratio would remain. In the wake of WWII, 
disadvantaged Muslims would let the issue of representation slide, but only for a time. 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 193. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Davis, 40Km Into Lebanon, 58. 
27 Harris, Lebanon: A History, 194. 
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The precarious political system held defiantly in the beginning, but began to show the 
first signs of collapse before too long. 
Shortly after the establishment of the National Pact, external factors and a series 
of unfortunate events upset the delicate balance in Lebanon and pressurized the state 
through the following decades. First, the 1947 United Nations resolution, which 
recommended partition of the British-held territory of Palestine, led to the creation of the 
state of Israel. The nationalist conflict that followed resulted in almost 120,000 
Palestinian refugees fleeing to southern Lebanon.28 Second, during the first Arab-Israeli 
conflict, Lebanon allied itself with the West against Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser and the 
neighboring Syrian Ba’thist Muslims. The subsequent military shaming of Nasser and the 
Arab conservatives garnered the former’s heroic image among Sunni Muslims and led 
that same group to an intellectual revival of the unified Arab caliphate philosophy that 
Lebanon had abandoned at its formation.29  
By May of 1958, external pressures turned into internal problems and led to a 
brief collapse of the Lebanese political system. American intervention was able to 
stabilize the situation through a peaceful intercession of 14,000 U.S. Marines.30 The third 
event to upset Lebanon’s precarious balance was the second flood of Palestinian refugees 
following King Hussein of Jordan’s forcible expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization’s (PLO) fighters in 1970. The arrival of additional Palestinian forces in 
Lebanon is arguably the most important factor in 20th century Lebanon’s death spiral. 
By July 1973, after numerous fractured ceasefire agreements and broken promises 
of peace, Jordan’s forces effectively dissolved the last vestiges of PLO power. The last of 
the embattled Palestinians in Jordan evacuated to Lebanon to recuperate and continue the 
conflict with Israel from a new base of operations. As historian William Harris stated, 
“Without the overwhelming impact of Palestinian militarization, there would have been 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 195. 
29 Davis, 40 Km Into Lebanon, 58–59. 
30 Undertaken in a Cold War context to counter Soviet influence and the rising United Arab movement 
sponsored by Soviet-leaning Nasser and Syria. Alasdair Soussi, “Legacy of U.S.’ 1958 Lebanon Invasion,” 
accessed November 15, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/07/201371411160525538.html.  
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time and opportunities to ameliorate domestic imbalances (in Lebanon).”31 To further 
compound the chaos of 1973, the Yom Kippur War between Israel and the Egyptians 
temporarily diverted international attention away from Lebanese domestic strife. 
Predictably, Lebanon’s factious government soon reached the end of its tolerance for 
Arafat’s radical Muslim “freedom fighters.”32  
The Fatah branch of the PLO, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat in 1974, 
called for the forceful liberation of the Palestinian people and establishment of the 
Palestinian state following the complete destruction of the Israelis. Following his United 
Nations general assembly address in 1974, Arafat described the PLO’s approach to the 
Israeli-Palestine problem going forward as, “carrying an olive branch in one hand and 
freedom fighter’s gun in the other.”33 Unfortunately for Christian Lebanese leaders, the 
staging area for PLO liberation operations had moved to their backyard.  
In 1975, mounting internal and regional pressures shattered Lebanon’s fragile 
domestic stability. Due to extremist activities by various groups embedded in the 
Connecticut-sized country, Lebanon exploded into another brutal, faction-led civil war 
that would last for several years and require another international intervention to salvage 
the beleaguered government. From 1976 through 1982, approximately 30,000 Syrian 
armed forces remained on Lebanese territory (with U.S., Arab League, and Lebanese 
diplomatic support) as invited peacekeepers in order to maintain some semblance of 
peace and order. For the Lebanese, the country became more divided than ever before as 
Christians backed their various regime-supporting militia groups, supported by Israeli 
interference, and Muslims backed their own separatist enclaves, supported by Syrian 
influence.34  
                                                 
31 Harris, Lebanon: A History, 220. 
32 Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War & Politics in a Fragmented Society (London: Routledge, 1996), 
179–180. 
33 Ofira Seliktar, “Israel’s Menachem Begin,” in Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East, ed. 
Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin  (New York: Praeger, 1988), 41. 
34 David Sylvan and Stephen Majeski, U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective: Clients, Enemies, and 
Empires (London: Routledge, 2009), Accompanying Notes website, http://www.us-foreign-policy-
perspective.org/index.php?id=311&L=-1%2527. 
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During this tumultuous period in Lebanon, Israel sought to advance its position 
against the PLO. Using all available political tools, the Israeli government simultaneously 
provided significant economic and military support to the Maronite Christian faction of 
Lebanon, the Phalange—led by the Gemayel family—to counter Syrian and Palestinian 
influence in the region.35 Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, working in tandem 
with his Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, took advantage of the deteriorated situation in its 
neighboring state to launch small-scale attacks across the border against PLO forces in 
southern Lebanon.  
Israel’s attacks into southern Lebanon did not stem the tide of PLO aggression 
into northern Israel. In response, Begin and Sharon acted in step with their hard-liner 
Likud political party; in the Likud’s view, the Palestinian problem in Lebanon would be 
best removed with a war of annihilation.36 The Israelis lacked the proper casus belli, 
however, to launch more than small-scale raids against the PLO without suffering 
international and domestic backlash. The attempted assassination of the Israeli 
Ambassador to Britain on June 4, 1982, was construed as a PLO terrorist attack and 
provided all the reason Begin needed to launch the Israeli invasion into Lebanon two 
days later.37 Ironically, it was called Operation Peace for Galilee—and it was anything 
but. In the meantime, the United States watched its foreign policy and grand strategy 
efforts in the Middle East go up in a blaze of Israeli artillery smoke. 
  
                                                 
35 Hallenbeck, Military Force, 4. 
36 Seliktar, “Israel’s Menachem,” 31–32. 
37 Winslow, Lebanon, 230. 
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II. THE STATE(S) OF AFFAIRS 
The following chapter provides insight into the circumstances, policies, and 
strategic goals of the participant countries prior to the 1982 U.S. intervention. While 
broad in scope, this is an attempt to establish belligerents’ motivations and 
comprehensive issues that affected their strategic calculus before and during the conflict. 
A. UNITED STATES 
As a result of the Camp David peace accords of 1979, the United States secured 
the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for Egyptian 
recognition of Israel’s sovereignty in the Middle East. Political agreements on the status 
of Palestinian autonomy and Israeli-occupation of Gaza and the West Bank were 
negotiated but left unresolved.38 Egypt was summarily ostracized by the rest of the Arab 
world for recognizing Israel and for making concessions in exchange for land that had 
once belonged to them. If the Camp David peace process constructed some form of 
autonomy and resolution for the Palestinian problem, Egypt hoped to leverage that 
success to rebuke its regional critics.39 
The United States shared Egypt’s views on Palestine’s autonomy issues: the U.S. 
had to find a peaceable solution to advance its strategic interests. The U.S. backed Israel 
during the Yom Kippur War, but needed to display its ability to be evenhanded with all 
parties in order to resolve the Arab-Israeli elephant in the region and supplant Soviet 
influence. Problematically, U.S. success as a regional influencer in the Middle East 
depended on Israel’s acceptance in the Arab world. Due to the nature of the alliance 
between the U.S. and Israel, and the fact that U.S. diplomacy orchestrated the Camp 
David accords that laid Egypt low, the United States reserved vested interests in 
engineering long-term peace options for the region.  
                                                 
38 “Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,” last modified October 31, 2013, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977–1980/camp-david. 
39 Hallenbeck, Military Force, 1. 
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From the outset of U.S. 1980s-era policy efforts in the Middle East, Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig attempted to build a coalition of partners against Soviet influence 
in the region before moving on to finding a lasting resolution for the Palestine issue.40 In 
accord with the Republican Party platform of 1980, Reagan’s top foreign policy objective 
was replacing USSR dominance around the world with U.S. superiority.41 As a result, 
U.S. foreign policy and strategy with regard to Lebanon and other powers in the Middle 
East is best understood within a Cold War context.  
Haig and others in Reagan’s organization saw the conflict in Lebanon as a 
potential stepping-stone in their quest for dominance over the USSR. If negotiated 
successfully, Soviet power in the region would be discredited through the departure of 
Syrian forces from Lebanon, while U.S. influence and preeminence in the Middle East 
would rise if the U.S. also secured the withdrawal of the Israelis. By aiding the embattled 
Lebanese government economically, diplomatically, and militarily, the United States 
could embolden a new regional partner free of Soviet or Zionist influence. If U.S. 
diplomatic efforts were extremely lucky, Syria could be courted away from the Soviet 
camp, (as the Egyptians were after Camp David) and the Israelis would be inclined to 
renegotiate with the PLO after the dust settled.42  
By May 26, 1982, Secretary of State Alexander Haig addressed the Chicago 
Council of Foreign Relations and succinctly described American foreign policy goals. 
Haig remarked that the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East was of grave concern to the 
United States, that President Reagan would soon initiate efforts to bring an end to the 
Iraq-Iran War, revitalize the Palestinian autonomy negotiations, and would seek to end 
the conflict that had been raging in Lebanon since the early 1970s.43 Less than two weeks 
after the Chicago speech, and without President Reagan’s blessing, Secretary Haig 
                                                 
40 Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “The Conduct of American Foreign Policy: Testing the Hard Line,” Foreign 
Affairs, February 1, 1983, accessed August 9, 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/37139/stephen-
s-rosenfeld/the-conduct-of-american-foreign-policy-testing-the-hard-line.  
41 Betty Glad, “The United State’s Ronald Reagan,” in Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East, 
ed. Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (New York: Praeger, 1988), 211. 
42 Hallenbeck, Military Force, 8–10. 
43 Davis, “Lebanon 1982.” 
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dispatched specific instructions to Phillip Habib, the president’s Special Negotiator in the 
Middle East.  
Negotiator Habib was to seek an end to the Lebanese conflict with three specific 
objectives: compel the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Lebanon, bolster the 
Lebanese government’s control of its state, and secure the northern border of Israel.44 
Though Reagan chastised Haig upon discovering his act of subterfuge (ordering 
negotiations prior to review by Reagan’s other chosen policy professionals), the president 
never rescinded Haig’s marching orders to Habib.45 Haig resigned in June of 1982 while 
Habib continued shuttle politics missions between Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and 
Washington. The United States soon discovered that attempting to broker the interests of 
Syria, the PLO, the divided Lebanese, the warring Israelis, and the rest of the incensed 
Middle East with U.S. diplomacy would require more than words and beleaguered 
statesmen. 
By August 21, 1982, after a month of relentless Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
bombardment and ceaseless U.S. diplomatic leaning on all involved, a plan for cessation 
of hostilities was finally agreed to. The PLO fighters would evacuate Lebanon in total, 
leaving their heavy weaponry and noncombatants to be absorbed by the Lebanese army 
and population, respectively. The tenuous peace plan contained a stipulation that a 
multinational peacekeeping force would be dispatched to Lebanon to oversee the 
evacuation of the PLO. Disregarding the objections of his Secretary of Defense, Caspar 
Weinberger, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vassey, President 
Reagan committed 800 U.S. Marines as peacekeepers alongside French and Italian 
forces. Reagan and some of his likeminded advisors saw this as a critical and necessary 
first step in advancing U.S. objectives in the region.46  
From the perspectives of President Reagan’s military leadership, intervention in 
Lebanon was high risk with little reward. For the promise of a tentative ceasefire and 
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evacuation, the U.S. military would be deployed into a hostile situation in which it could 
potentially be targeted and restricted in its response. Analogies were drawn between the 
Marines’ presence in Lebanon and situations American forces faced in Vietnam: 
constraints on the Marines’ ability to respond to the threat of factious forces outside of 
their understanding would unnecessarily endanger them and had the potential to embroil 
the United States in another conflict that, to the government and the U.S. public, seemed 
to be on the periphery of strategic concern at best.47 
Weinberger and Vassey raised very explicit concerns regarding the size and 
employment of U.S. forces. From their assessments, “The force was too small to fight 
successfully if required to do so, but too large to avoid being visible, and therefore 
vulnerable.”48 There were also concerns raised about the potential force’s host, “As one 
of the world’s two superpowers, the United States could not commit its armed forces into 
volatile areas without risk of becoming someone else’s surrogate.”49 House 
Representative Sam Gibbons echoed Weinberger and Vassey’s concerns, “If we are there 
to keep peace, we are far too few…. If we are there to die, then we are far too many.”50 
Reagan understood these concerns, but recognized that great power backing was 
required to support the government of Lebanon (GOL)—the PLO had to be removed 
benevolently in order to begin the peace process and convince the Arabs that the U.S. 
was an honest broker for all in the Middle East. To mitigate the danger to U.S. forces, 
President Reagan, at the insistence of Weinberger, asserted that peacekeepers would only 
remain in Beirut as long as the PLO maintained its part of the evacuation agreements and 
only as long as Marines were not the target of hostilities.51 In order to ensure Marines 
were not exposed to unnecessary risk, they would not leave the relative safety of the port 
of Beirut during the evacuation. The president reported to Congress, as is required under 
the War Powers Act when deploying forces abroad, that the military’s operation would be 
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a 30-day commitment. By August 21, the administration’s plan was executed and the 
evacuation was underway. 
The multinational peacekeeping force (MNF) successfully interceded and the 
PLO was peacefully removed. An estimated 15,000 PLO fighters and some elements of 
the Syrian army were relocated either by sea to sponsored locations or over land to Syria. 
By September 1, four days after the MNF arrived in Lebanon, President Reagan, hoping 
to ride the wave of success that followed in the wake of the evacuation, announced his 
comprehensive plan for peace in the Middle East. He proposed that an autonomous 
Palestinian body politic be created within a federation of the Kingdom of Jordan. 
President Reagan also recommended that Israel cease any new immigration efforts into 
Gaza and the West Bank, and in exchange, the Arab world would recognize Israel’s 
borders and sovereignty.52 It was clear from Reagan’s newest proposal that the president 
believed the Middle East was ready to accept a U.S. solution and that the conflict in 
Lebanon, in his mind, was under control and could be exploited for U.S. strategic gain.  
President Reagan attempted to communicate to the Arab World with his new plan 
that U.S. efforts in Lebanon were intimately linked to broader U.S. goals in the region.53 
Undeniably, Reagan’s grand strategy was built in direct response to his belief that Soviet 
backing of Syrian and PLO forces in Lebanon was creating conflict and degrading U.S. 
influence in the region. As Alexander Haig stated, “the advance of Soviet influence in the 
Middle East could best be checked by a show of U.S. resolve.”54 Prior to the 
announcement, Reagan’s Middle East advisors informed him that Jordan would back the 
peace initiative within hours of the announcement and that the Saudis, who had 
previously engineered their own proposals in concert with Egypt and Jordan, were 
onboard as well. The Israeli response was expected to be amenable as public opinion in 
Israel was pushing Begin’s government to get out of Lebanon.55 Unfortunately, none of 
the advisors’ forecasts held true.  
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The Israelis rejected the proposal completely and the Arab League headed by 
Saudi Arabian King Fahd refused to acknowledge anyone but the PLO as the lawful 
Palestinian authority.56 President Reagan, possibly in response to Israeli inflexibility or 
frustration at the collapse of his proposal, directed the two-week early withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from the MNF. The strategy remained to lock the Arab world and the Israelis into 
a U.S. solution for the region’s problems through diplomatic leverage and mediation with 
minimal (preferably no) military effort. Regrettably, this was not the last time these 
Marines would have their boots on the ground in Lebanon. 
B. ISRAEL 
Israel, the focus of Haig’s Middle East coalition of partners against the USSR, 
stood as a difficult and intractable ally for U.S. policy goals. The 1977 political victory of 
Menachem Begin, leader of the hard-liner, New Zionist Likud party, ensured that Israeli 
strategic and operational goals in the period before the Lebanese conflict were lockstep 
with New Zionist beliefs. New Zionism is a loose adaptation of National-Religious 
Zionism combined with historiophilosophical interpretations regarding the stance of anti-
Semitism and the legacy of the Holocaust affecting the nation of Israel.57 New Zionism 
united with Begin’s vision of Israel’s proper place in the world formed a noted departure 
from Israel’s previous foreign policies. 
The Israeli Prime Minister adopted an idealistic approach to foreign policy 
previously unseen in Israeli leadership. Following closely with the New Zionist’s way of 
thinking, Begin’s foreign policy modus operandi was based on two not-necessarily-
supportive elements: high risk taking, and calculation of success based on measurable 
factors coupled with intangibles such as destiny and the will of God.58 Strategic 
calculations made in this fashion affect the international outlook of an actor. The 
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idealistic posture of the Likud party led it to adopt a more aggressive and initiating stance 
in foreign affairs.59 
Evidence for Israeli motivation for and transition to more aggressive foreign 
policies may be extrapolated from Begin’s personal beliefs and writings. According to 
one author’s attempt to psychologically profile the Prime Minister, “There is no doubt 
that in Begin’s vision, this universe is one of unremitting conflict.”60 Begin’s outlook 
stemmed from what the Prime Minister described as “the rules of history,” where 
struggles of a people engaged in a conflict of liberation must inevitably lead to national 
sovereignty and international recognition.61 Begin also believed that resistance to and 
elimination of PLO aggression was essential for Israel’s progress internationally and 
stated in his 1982 address to the UN62 wars of self-defense were “the noblest concept of 
mankind.”63 
With Begin’s beliefs and ideological influences in mind, it comes as no surprise 
that he eschewed previously pursued policies as negative and counterproductive to 
Israel’s future. Begin was personally committed to the notion of Eretz Israel (the Land of 
Israel) and rejected the previous parties’ notion of territorial compromise with the 
Palestinians and other Arab leaders in exchange for peace. As a result, Begin maintained 
throughout his tenure as Prime Minister that Arab nations would never accept a Jewish 
state in their midst and only violent persuasion would ensure that they had no choice but 
to acquiesce.64 The Yom Kippur conflict provided the stark example the Arab world 
needed of Israeli capabilities, and the PLO would serve as another illustration of the 
Likud party’s favored brand of coercive diplomacy. 
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The decision to invade Lebanon ran parallel with the New Zionist 
administration’s long-term ideological pursuits. The Likud party would not seek peace 
through negotiation with the Muslim political power players in the region (Saudi Arabia 
and Syria), feeling that their interests could never be realized through Arab-led 
settlements. Various New Zionist ideologists advocated for alliances with the periphery 
instead (i.e., non-Muslim minorities like the Maronite Christians of Lebanon).65  
The resulting operational solution to the PLO problem called for a strong 
Maronite government in Beirut supportive of Israel’s security interests and allied through 
an Israeli-brokered settlement. Long-standing strategic considerations by the IDF also 
lent credence to an invasion of Lebanon for a multitude of reasons: Lebanon provided 
legitimacy to the PLO as a political entity, allowed for a base of military operations 
against the Israeli border, and PLO in southern Lebanon and the West Bank foiled the 
Likud party’s attempts at annexation and expansion of Eretz Israel.66 Recognizing that 
beliefs alone do not necessitate a state’s decision to undertake a military invasion, other 
regional developments also influenced the decision to assault Lebanon. 
A conflict along the Israeli-Lebanese border in 1978 would have repercussions for 
future Israeli efforts. A PLO terrorist attack across the Lebanese border prompted the 
Israelis to invade and occupy southern Lebanon to the Litani River in order to oust the 
PLO and establish a security buffer zone to Israel’s north. Under international pressure, 
the Israelis eventually withdrew and were to be replaced with the United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), however, the Israelis left behind and empowered with 
funding and arms a rebel Lebanese Army major named Saad Haddad to harass UNIFIL 
and PLO forces.67 Initial efforts to dislodge the PLO failed, but were not forgotten; the 
failure of Operation Litani would influence later operations. 
Other regional and international actions further hardened the Likud party’s stance. 
Syria attempted to implement its program of National Reconciliation in the spring of 
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1981. The solution called for redistribution of administrative control in Lebanon, further 
empowered the autonomy of the PLO, and would have weakened Maronite struggles 
against the Palestinians. The program explicitly called for all Lebanese parties to 
recognize the “international legitimacy of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.”68  In 
response, the leader of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), Bashir Gemayel, provoked 
Syrian action against Christian militia forces in Mount Senin and simultaneously secured 
Israeli support via air attacks against Syrian helicopter forces. In the aftermath of Syria’s 
losses in the air, Syria countered by staging anti-aircraft SAM-6 missiles in the Bekaa 
Valley. U.S. diplomatic mediation was unable to secure the removal of Syria’s missiles. 
Diplomatic failure only reinforced Begin’s view that greater military power was 
required.69 
Another development that enabled Likud party aggression in Lebanon: the 
Reagan administration assumed office. In Reagan’s campaign speeches of 1979, he noted 
that Israel was, “perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region.”70 President 
Reagan also publically remarked that a U.S.-promoted peace plan in the Middle East 
should not try to “force any settlement on the Israelis.”71 The U.S. and Israeli 
governments signed a Memorandum of Agreement in September of 1981 promising 
cooperation, including force training and stockpiling of military resources, against any 
threat to peace from USSR or USSR-sponsored forces. True to the taciturn Prime 
Minister’s personality, however, the relationship would be tested in short order.  
Trouble arose from overt action to expand Likud party regional aspirations. Begin 
refused, despite U.S. pressure, to relinquish positions in Gaza or the West Bank based on 
his belief that any Israeli government that recognized Palestinian territorial autonomy or 
validity would fail to survive politically.72 The Israeli cabinet, at Begin’s insistence, also 
refused to curtail immigration efforts into the disputed territories. The Israeli 
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administration also passed a plan to annex the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights that 
resulted in the U.S. suspending its memorandum of agreement from September. Begin 
responded with a venomous diatribe: “Are we a banana republic? Are we fourteen-year-
olds, who if we misbehave, we get our wrists slapped?”73 Israeli acts of defiance only 
served to prevent any delusions that U.S. foreign policy was going to control Israel or 
gain popularity with the other Middle Eastern states in the early 1980s. 
Despite the strained relationship between U.S. and Israeli leaders, the latter did 
inform the U.S. before they took action in Lebanon, albeit not necessarily to the scale 
they intended. In October 1981, at the funeral for former Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat, Begin informed Alexander Haig that Israel was planning a move against the PLO 
that would not involve Syria. Under the substantial strategic influence of Israeli Chief of 
Staff Rafael Eitan and Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, the IDF was authorized waves 
of air raids against PLO strongholds in Lebanon during the summer of 1981.74 By May 
1982, Ariel Sharon visited Washington, DC, and outlined details for two potential plans: 
one to pacify southern Lebanon, the other to violently re-draw the political map to favor 
Lebanese Christian parties.75 
The U.S. response to Israel’s proposed endeavors was mixed at best and provided 
unspoken approval at worst. Haig answered Begin’s promise of future action by saying, 
“Israel would be alone if it undertook any such action, but one could not deny their right 
of self-defense.”76 Later, in an act of self-preservation, Haig would claim to have 
denounced Sharon’s two outlines for invasion in the “plainest possible language.”77 
Sharon, however, took away from the meeting that the U.S. would not object to Israel’s 
plans as removal of the PLO problem benefitted everyone’s interests.78  
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The Israeli leadership felt it had a tacit endorsement from its most important ally; 
an event big enough to supply a proportional cause was still missing. The attempted 
assassination of the Israeli ambassador Shlomo Argov on June 3, 1982, reportedly by 
PLO agents, was everything the Israeli hawks needed. The PLO’s second-in-command 
Salah Khalaf immediately disavowed PLO involvement but responded that they were 
prepared to respond to Israel if necessary.79 By June 4, IDF forces launched major 
bombing campaigns against the PLO in both southern Lebanon and Beirut. The PLO 
retaliated with mostly ineffectual artillery strikes. With cabinet approval in hand, Begin’s 
strategy for Israeli dominance of the PLO was enacted and the Israeli army advanced 
around the ineffectual UNIFIL forces on June 6. 
The plan for the invasion of Lebanon essentially called for an expanded version of 
Operation Litani. In the year preceding the invasion, a number of plans were drafted with 
similar strategic goals: establish a 40-kilometer security zone in southern Lebanon, avoid 
conflict with the Syrians, and destroy PLO artillery, forces, and potential terrorist 
positions. The Israeli cabinet met on June 5 and gave Defense Minister Sharon 
permission to cross the Lebanese border to establish the cordon sanitaire. Israel attacked 
Lebanon in force, sending approximately 80,000 men and 1250 tanks across the border 
accompanied by heavy air and artillery strikes. Chief of Staff Eitan later insisted on 
several occasions that he and the army never received instructions to limit the IDF’s 
advance.80 
C. PALESTINE 
Prior to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, the policies and strategies of the PLO 
reflected its tumultuous beginnings. The PLO was established in 1964 under the 
supervision of the Arab League and with the support of Egyptian President Nasser in an 
effort to provide the Palestinians a political voice and secure the Arab League a measure 
of control. In the minds of the Arab League, the PLO’s efforts of righteous retaliation 
against the Israeli’s were better aligned with their interests if employed when they 
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deemed it time to do so.81 In other words, regionally the PLO was just another instrument 
in the Arab states’ Pan-Arabism toolbox to be used when it fit the situation. The varied 
factions that formed the PLO in the mid-1960s were restricted in their designs against 
Israel as bitterly by the Arab states as they were by the USSR and the U.S.—Israeli 
alliance.82 
The intervening years between the PLO’s formation and the start of the Lebanese 
war in 1982 exacerbated Palestinian misfortunes. The death of the Egyptian—Syrian Pan-
Arabism movement following the humiliating defeat of Nasser in 1967, military losses 
suffered in Jordan from 1970–71, and indecisive actions in the Lebanese Civil War from 
1975–76 deepened Palestinian struggles and fostered resentment as a people in exile. One 
point of optimism stood out for the beleaguered people of Palestine; the Arab League and 
the U.N. General Assembly internationally recognized the PLO, headed by Yasser 
Arafat’s Fatah faction, as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in 1974.83 
Yasser Arafat was convinced that the narrow attentions of the Arab states would 
always demand precedence over Palestinian interests and decided more independent 
action was required to ensure the PLO’s success. Representative of Arafat’s charismatic 
leadership, the Fatah was able to absorb disparate groups with divergent political and 
military visions of how to remove the Israeli problem and what the future of the 
Palestinian state should be.84 As a result, the PLO contained a coalition of factions that 
supported Arafat’s Fatah ideologies in principle but with potential to vary widely across 
the spectrum of their beliefs. The coalesced groups also contained sufficient strength to 
insist their opinions be heard when they dissented. Consequently, the PLO’s system of 
governance is coalition-based (as is Israel’s) and subject to the general consensus of its 
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members, making political compromise difficult if any members disagree and are loud 
enough in their disproval.85 
Militarily, the PLO and its Lebanese allies were virtually isolated on the field of 
battle. Aggregate PLO forces numbered a few thousand irregular combatants and militia 
fighters, most of which were untrained, ill-equipped, unsupported by any major logistics 
plan, and chaotically organized. Although Syria maintained significant forces in Lebanon 
throughout the war, from the outset Israel maintained that the PLO was their sole target 
and Syrian leaders fell for it. On June 9, three days into the conflict, Israel dealt a 
humiliating defeat to Syrian anti-air forces. After Syria’s ceasefire agreement with Israel 
on June 11, its armed forces would, with the exception of its army units trapped alongside 
the PLO in Beirut, not be a factor in the conflict. Barring minor engagements, the PLO 
was in this fight alone and was vastly inferior to its adversary in almost every 
conceivable way.86 
Not only were the PLO alone militarily, they were isolated diplomatically as well. 
In earlier Israeli assaults, the Palestinians reaped the benefits of true Arab state sympathy; 
the Arab states were willing to unite around the PLO in order to pressure the U.S. to reign 
in Israel. By 1982, the Arab states’ good will had run out: Lebanon wanted them out, Iraq 
and Iran were busy killing each other, Syria wanted Lebanon for itself, Saudi Arabia was 
consolidating its regional influence, Egypt was an Israeli supporter, and Jordan was 
understandably unwilling to aid the PLO a second time.87 To make matters worse, the 
USSR explicitly told PLO leaders they would not intervene on their behalf; Palestine had 
no superpower counterweight to the American support.88 Knowing that their cause was 
almost certainly doomed, what could Arafat and his followers have hoped to achieve? 
Saddled with an inferior force and with minimal diplomatic aid forthcoming, the 
PLO’s grand strategy reflected their brutal reality. The Palestinians’ short-term goal was 
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to simply survive. Arrayed against Israeli might, this was a genuinely desperate 
undertaking in and of itself. It also helped, however, that the PLO’s continued resistance 
served to advance their long-term strategies as well. The PLO knew it had to “keep the 
issue of Palestine open, keep the world community aware of it, and to work to the 
disadvantage of Israel whenever possible.”89 Arafat and an increasing number of PLO 
leaders also realized that their previously stated goals of the complete destruction of 
Israel alongside the creation of a Palestinian state were impossible in their current state. 
Militarily and diplomatically, the strategy had to be to create the conditions for cutting 
the best deal possible, preferably brokered by both superpowers. The Palestinians had no 
other options.90 
D. LEBANON 
Like all of the other Middle Eastern states, Lebanon is a product of guided 
creation, not natural evolution. Its borders and its people reflect neither natural cohesion 
nor sustainable and optimal allocation of control. Lebanon also has a unique feature 
unlike other Arab states: its history and culture allow for closer Western ties that have 
served as both a blessing and a curse. It is under the auspices of this curse that Lebanon’s 
struggles coalesced before the conflict of 1982. 
In the years leading to the Israeli conflict, Lebanese leaders were characterized as 
identifying their visions with those of varied nationalist parties. Significantly, this results 
in political and military conflicts between competing brands of nationalism, as evidenced 
by the 1975 civil war. The PLO exacerbated sectarian division by arming, training, and 
employing their favored Muslim militias in order to support Palestinian political 
establishment against the nationalist counter-movements in the Maronite and Sunni 
communities. In general, the Muslim factions identified with a larger sense of Arab 
nationalism while Christians maintained a narrower view of Lebanese identity, as one 
would expect due to Maronite hegemonic dominance of the Lebanese political system. 
As a result, powerful military leaders like Bashir Gemayel of the Phalangist Christian 
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militia were able to consolidate their power, eliminate weaker rivals, and impose control 
over fighters in a unified structure under their direct command.91 
Bashir Gemayel’s rise to power was marked by dogged determination. Regular 
intracommunal and proxy wars between factions within Lebanon allowed Gemayel to 
eliminate his rivals through various atrocities committed between 1978 and 1982. 
Gemayel’s goal was to revive and defend Maronite Christian Lebanon, however, he 
chose to do so by removing opponents permanently, warlord style. The militarist leader 
eliminated competing Presidential-hopeful Tony Franjieh in a turf battle,92 forcefully 
absorbed former-President Chamille Chamoun’s militia forces and holdings,93 and 
successfully supplanted then-President Elias Sarkis and his state-sponsored Lebanese 
Army as the premier force fighting Syrian occupation in the late 1970s.94 By the time 
Gemayel was finished with his violence-driven power grab, the self-proclaimed “liberator 
of Christian Lebanon”95 was the only Christian leader left standing in the rubble.  
Regardless of who the last man standing was in the intracommunal conflicts and 
nationalist struggles, Lebanon’s political institutions were so weak that the state had a 
long history of appealing to outside powers for assistance. Gemayel would do the same at 
the outset of the Israeli invasion. Throughout Lebanon’s conflicted history, it has at one 
point or another turned to the United States, France, Syria, and Israel to alleviate its woes 
through military intervention.96  
The recurring pattern of foreign intervention displays an insurmountable 
contradiction in Lebanese leadership; the president is elected based on nationalist support 
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and identification with one group’s interests.97 When conflict rears its bloody head, as it 
inevitably will in a state like Lebanon with a poisonous political environment and absent 
reforms, the state’s leader lacks the cross-factional support required to sustain 
government control and pleads for international intervention to reassert their regime for 
them. While hosting the PLO-Israeli conflict of the 1980s, the Lebanese grand strategy 
was simple, reflected the nature of the problem, and was also historically sound: get 
someone else, preferably a certain western superpower, to save them.98 
E. THE HEART OF THE MATTER 
To review briefly, at the heart of the problem is the Arab-Israeli conflict that 
occurs in a dimension of polarized Middle Eastern politics. Lebanese leaders cried out for 
foreign intervention in their nationalist, sectarian conflict. The United States decided to 
intervene under the auspice of “solving” the Arab-Israeli problem, but in reality to 
supplant the USSR’s regional influence with its own and to advance its strategic goals. 
The Israelis were fighting to destroy, the Palestinians were fighting to survive, the 
Lebanese were fighting each other while looking for someone else to solve their problem, 
and the United States never fully understood the quagmire it was stepping into. 
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III. EXECUTION 
“I know that whoever sets his foot in Lebanon has sunk into the Lebanon 
swamp.”99 
—Yizhak Rabin  
A. NEVER TOO LATE TO START AGAIN 
By September 14, 1982, four days after the U.S. Marines finalized reconstitution 
on their ships, an explosion at Phalangist party headquarters in Beirut assassinated 
Christian President-elect Bashir Gemayel. In response, the IDF returned to shelling West 
Beirut in flagrant violation of the ceasefire agreement negotiated by Special Negotiator 
Habib. In reprisal for the murder of their leader, Phalangist militiamen massacred 
defenseless women, children, and Palestinian elders in refugee camps at Sabra and 
Shatila while IDF forces in charge of camp security failed to intercede.100  
The IDF, while not the executors, were undoubtedly complacent, and the United 
States was seen as culpable as well due to the U.S. decision to withdraw the MNF. 
Lebanon was once again in flames and unable to assert any control over the rapidly 
deteriorating situation. The Arab League accused the United States of being “morally 
responsible” and assertively supported PLO demands for the return of the MNF.101 
After the reentry of the IDF into Beirut and the massacre of the Palestinian 
refugees, senior administration officials felt obligated to respond. President Reagan, 
however, did not embrace responsibility: “I don’t think that specifically there could be 
assigned a responsibility on our part for withdrawing our troops…They were sent in there 
with one understanding…and that mission was completed.”102 In private, Reagan’s 
opinions were different; he told his National Security Advisors in a meeting that the 
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nation had, “inherited a responsibility (in Lebanon).”103 Secretary of State Schultz 
recalled later in his memoirs: “Everyone knew the President was ready to send the 
Marines back to Lebanon, so the military had to appear to be responsive.”104  
Most concerning, the decision to redeploy the Marines to Lebanon was made 
seemingly in haste, with little consideration given to the mission or the objectives. 
National Security Advisor William Clark’s Deputy, Robert McFarlane, is quoted as 
saying that, “the Marines were sent in out of guilt and compassion, purely as moral 
support, without clarity or analysis beyond that level.”105 CJCS Vessey explained later, 
“After the massacre we (Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs) didn’t want to go back in, but 
there wasn’t any good argument for not going back in.”106 Furthermore, there are 
allegations that neither SECDEF Weinberger nor Vessey formally requested clarification 
of the purpose or end date of the deployment prior to the redeploy.107 However, damning 
McFarlane’s condemnation may sound,108 the administration’s actions were not 
completely devoid of analysis—as will be discussed later, the administration undertook 
two deliberate reappraisals of strategy and force disposition later in the conflict. This 
does not, however, excuse the seeming lack of complex analysis prior to the decision to 
redeploy. 
President Reagan’s administration considered three simple options for 
intervention in Lebanon. One could refer to them as ‘Go Big, Go Small, or Stay Home.’ 
Go Big, a large force option favored by McFarlane, was proposed and was similar to 
what the U.S. used in 1958 in Lebanon to assist Chamoun’s regime. In principle, a large 
force could easily convince all belligerents to stand down and allow for the Lebanese 
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government to reassert control of the state. Second, SECSTATE Schultz proposed ‘Go 
Small,’ which envisioned sending in a small multinational force, analogous to the first 
MNF, to stabilize Beirut and allow diplomacy to resolve the ongoing issues. Special 
Negotiator Habib supported him.109 Ralph Hallenbeck, then a senior officer involved 
with planning U.S. force deployment to Lebanon, captured the general opinions behind 
the military aspect of the Schultz plan: 
A small force seemed prudent and sufficient for the immediate task of 
stabilizing the situation in Lebanon’s capital city. Additionally, a small 
force could be deployed more quickly than a large one; it would be less 
likely to provoke a U.S.-Soviet confrontation; and it would be simpler to 
introduce and less costly to support. It would also keep the U.S. 
contribution in proportion to the French and Italian contributions, thus 
fostering perceptions that the interpositional forces were truly 
multinational and neutral with respect to the military and political interests 
of the factional antagonists.110 
Serious doubts surrounded Schultz’s proposal. McFarlane argued that Lebanese 
leaders and military forces were in no position to obtain a ceasefire. Another critic 
pointedly asserted that the Schultz plan depended on an, “astounding reliance on a best-
case scenario.”111 In order for Schultz’s best-case scenario to occur, the Lebanese 
government would be required to secure and enforce a ceasefire between the Israelis, 
PLO, Syrian forces, and warring internal factions while simultaneously assuring the 
Israelis of a secure northern border and convincing the Syrians to shift the balance of 
regional power in favor of Israeli and American interests.112 It is hard to imagine any 
political leader considering Shultz’s proposal for Lebanon as anything but a nigh 
impossible endeavor. 
Weinberger proposed ‘Stay Home.’ His plan requested a delay of the Marines’ 
return until all foreign forces had left Lebanon. Only after the belligerents’ departures 
would the U.S. deploy a large enough contingency capable of isolating the perimeter of 
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Lebanon so that the LAF could control its internal security and a government of 
reconciliation could be formed. According to Schultz, Weinberger felt it was too risky to 
return to Beirut and “simply hope for the best.”113 Accordingly, Schultz was less than 
happy with Weinberger’s response. “I was, under this ‘plan,’ supposed to conduct 
diplomacy without strength, with no military backup—and in pursuit of a ludicrously 
impossible ideal.”114 Not surprisingly, determining how to relate military power to 
political goals and diplomacy would remain a problem throughout the intervention. 
The United States received a formal request from the GOL for the return of the 
MNF on 20 September. The same Marines that oversaw the evacuation of the PLO just 
nineteen days prior were redeployed to Lebanon, this time with new marching orders.115 
The United States decided to keep a lost cause from losing. 
The strategy of the second U.S. intervention in Lebanon is best described in 
political terms vice military doctrine. The Schultz Plan carried the day in Reagan’s 
administration and is reflected in the intervention’s execution order. From the mission 
statement sent from Commander, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to the 
Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, the U.S. MNF was tasked as follows: 
To establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed 
Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut Area. When directed, 
USCINCEUR will introduce U.S. Forces as part of a multinational force 
presence in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a 
designated section of the line from south of the Beirut International 
Airport to a position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be prepared 
to protect U.S. Forces; and, on order, conduct retrograde operations as 
required.116 
Thus U.S. forces were initially deployed as an impartial “presence” and symbol of 
U.S. power meant to enhance the sovereignty of the GOL. The problem with the strategic 
framework of the Lebanese intervention is that neither presence nor enhancing 
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sovereignty is a military mission; both terms are political objectives assigned to a military 
force. The construction of the JCS order also made two other points clear—the Marines 
in Lebanon were not expected to engage in combat and would be withdrawn if hostilities 
toward them occurred. The duration of the operation was expected to last for 60 days.117  
By September 29, Approximately 1200 Marines were established in positions 
centering on the Beirut International Airport (BIA). Their objective was to prevent 
violence through presence while restricted to self-defense-only Rules of Engagement 
(ROE). Unfortunately, September 28 was the day that President Reagan publicly 
announced his next policy change for Lebanon. The Marines would continue their 
mission in perpetuity until all foreign fighters had been withdrawn.118 Reagan’s 
statement cast doubt on the scope and scale of the military’s role, and made it subject to 
the diplomatic acquiescence of other actors that the United States did not control. Sensing 
an opportunity, newly-installed Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, recently assassinated 
Bashir’s brother, traveled to Washington shortly after the announcement to request 
expansion of the MNF to include more Marines capable of directly supporting Lebanese 
army and militia forces in operations.119 
While the U.S. continued its negotiations with the various belligerent factions, the 
first strategic reappraisal of the intervention occurred at home. National Security 
Decision Directive (NSDD) 64 was signed into effect in late October of 1982. Calling 
NSDD 64 a strategic reappraisal is not entirely accurate. The document codified the 
Reagan administration’s commitment to remove all foreign fighters from Lebanon, 
expanded the area of the MNF’s patrols into Eastern Beirut, and set a timeline for 
success—the end of 1982. Essentially, the presence mission remained the same, but 
expanded to new areas.120  
American troops were also authorized in November to assist in rebuilding the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by training and equipping its forces. The strategy to 
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rebuild the LAF was aligned with a report provided by Brigadier General Bartlett to the 
Department of Defense on November 1. The Bartlett Report called for a complete 
restructuring and rebuilding of the wholly ineffectual LAF command and brigade 
structures.121 Significant economic and military aid was poured into Lebanon from the 
United States in order to assist with rebuilding efforts which may well have reminded 
some of another, similar effort associated with a conflict still very fresh in their 
memories: “Vietnamization.” 
By mid-November of 1982, the U.S. Department of Defense officially established 
its Office of Military Cooperation and began to staff it with Army officers tasked with 
spearheading the LAF revisions.122 Regardless of the speed and alacrity that the U.S. 
attempted to infuse in its Lebanese allies, the fledgling military forces were predicted to 
be at only 70% strength by February of 1983, and even then, only four brigades—not 
nearly enough to maintain sovereignty of a deeply domestically troubled state like 
Lebanon.123 Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs favored redoubling the efforts to train the 
LAF through the newly established office in order to avoid deploying larger forces into 
the area.124 
Due to the significant number of foreign troops still in and threatening Lebanon, 
the Reagan administration refused to add additional Marines to the MNF but did expand 
involvement through NSDD 64. The MNF began patrols of the local Beirut area in the 
vicinity of the airport and Eastern Beirut.125 Changes in operational tasking were codified 
in change three to the original tasking order for the Marine forces in Lebanon, which up 
to this point had retained its original, ambiguous guidance from the JCS.126  
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Most importantly, the U.S. and Lebanon failed to capitalize on what proved to be 
a fleeting opportunity to force a solution. Schultz would later recall, “Our most important 
missed opportunity came in September and October 1982—a time when the situation was 
most fluid, when Syria was in a weakened position, and when the Lebanese could have 
best responded to a strong U.S. initiative.”127 The policies and strategies of Reagan’s 
administration by the close of 1982 created a rapidly expanding morass that threatened to 
draw the United States into full-blown war in Lebanon by the Spring of 1983. 
B. EXPANDED ROLES LEAD TO CONFLICT 
In the early months of 1983, the situation in Lebanon was rapidly deteriorating for 
the MNF and Reagan’s policy hopes were hanging by a frayed thread. President Reagan’s 
administration made little to no progress toward settling the dispute in Lebanon, and all 
sides involved, with the exception of the GOL, rejected the Reagan Plan. President 
Gemayel failed to initiate serious steps of reconciliation, further enflaming Muslim and 
Druze militant’s anger.128 In February, U.S. Ambassador Habib offered, with Reagan and 
the Senate’s approval, to defend Israel’s northern border with more American and 
Lebanese troops if the Israelis would withdraw.129 In March, the Israelis accepted the 
offer. By then, however, the tables had begun to turn on the Americans again. 
Sporadic attacks on the MNF began in March of 1983; a hand grenade killed five 
U.S. Marines, and French and Italian Officers were similarly threatened at their locations. 
On April 18, 1983, the U.S. Embassy was car-bombed and 63 lives were lost, American 
and international.130 Congress began to question the president’s assessment of the 
potential for hostilities, but did not attempt to force his hand through the War Powers 
Resolution. Instead, Congress produced legislation that restricted any significant change 
to the location, mission, or size of the current MNF, effectively hamstringing 
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Ambassador Habib’s guarantees of military support.131 After dispatching Schultz to 
personally secure a peace accord between Israel and Lebanon, an agreement was finally 
reached in May. The Israelis promised to withdraw if the Syrians would too.  
The Syrians were no longer willing to abandon their interests in Lebanon. With 
Soviet assistance during the lull in fighting in late 1982, the Syrians rearmed, refitted, and 
gained support from Lebanese Muslims and Druze clans that were tired of having their 
requests for political reform ignored by Gemayel’s government. From the perspectives of 
the Muslim militias and Druze clan fighters, Gemayel would be even less likely to 
relinquish his Maronite Christian chokehold on Lebanon’s politics once he was backed 
by a strong LAF equipped and trained by the Americans. These groups, backed by Syria, 
would resist all attempts at LAF control of Lebanon. Schultz’s mutual withdrawal 
agreement never had a chance.132 
Fast-forward from spring to summer of 1983 and the Marines’ role had expanded 
further, but not nearly as comprehensively as the Lebanese or Schultz would have liked. 
President Gemayel continued to request enlarged MNF patrols and coordination with 
LAF offensive movements while JCS and the USEUCOM Commander continued to 
disprove. SECSTATE Shultz actively sought more international support for the MNF in 
Lebanon, while the JCS developed plans for expanding U.S. commitment despite 
discontent amongst civilian and military leaders.133 With no significant progress made 
over the summer and held in check by congressional legislation, Reagan’s administration 
initiated its next strategic reappraisal in NSDD 103, “Strategy for Lebanon.”  
NSDD 103 was a policy change produced in September that attempted to walk “a 
fine line between using military force and avoiding a War Powers dispute.”134 The 
NSDD included “aggressive self-defense” ROE in conjunction with artillery support, 
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intelligence gathering, and reconnaissance flights.135 Naval and air efforts were 
coordinated in concert with the other contributing nations of the MNF, the French and 
Italians. Increased support efforts meant that Gemayel’s forces were eligible to receive 
twenty-minute delayed targeting data from Army radar teams recently positioned 
alongside the MNF.136 All of this was done to demonstrate united resolve to Syria and 
others while efforts continued to secure more international support for the Lebanese.137 
Officially, U.S. forces in Lebanon were given more mission flexibility to protect 
the U.S., UK Embassy and forces embedded at BIA. Reassurances were passed to 
Congress that the situation on the ground had not dramatically changed and that the 
recent surge in fighting was merely “isolated events” not targeted at peacekeeping 
forces.138 The change was in fact necessitated by mortars and rockets regularly landing 
around friendly positions at BIA, and the JCS was concerned about further terrorist 
attacks.139 Robert McFarlane, now President Reagan’s personal representative in the 
Middle East, warned in early September of a “serious threat of a decisive military defeat 
which could involve the fall of the Government of Lebanon within twenty-four hours.”140 
He also requested and received a special addendum to NSDD 103 allowing the Marines 
at BIA to use naval gunfire and air strikes in support of the Lebanese army.141 
It is critical to highlight and evaluate the change to NSDD 103 initiated by 
McFarlane. From the addendum to the NSDD passed on 11 September:  
It has been determined that occupation of the dominant terrain in the 
vicinity of Suq-Al-Gharb by hostile forces will endanger Marine positions. 
Therefore, successful LAF defense of the area of Suq-Al-Gharb is vital to 
the safety of U.S. personnel….As a consequence, when the U.S. ground 
commander determines that Suq-Al-Gharb is in danger of falling as a 
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result of attack involving non-Lebanese forces and if requested by the host 
government, appropriate U.S. military assistance in defense of Suq-Al-
Gharb is authorized.142 
NSDD 103 was an attempt to pacify both sides of Reagan’s administration. On 
one hand, President Reagan had Schultz, McFarlane, and others pressing for undeniable 
military commitment in Lebanon. On the other, SECDEF Weinberger and CJCS Vessey 
disagreed vehemently and ensured that the military tool was as narrowly constrained in 
its use as they could make it. In practice this constraint only served to further obfuscate 
the situation for forces on the ground.143  
The U.S. military chain-of-command was incensed with NSDD 103. From the top 
brass to the combatant commander in charge, USEUCOM, all involved recognized the 
potential magnitude of the MNF’s change in disposition.144 The NSDD changes 
undermined the entire purpose of the MNF; “neutral peacekeeping presence operations 
with a multinational force”145 was no longer a viable description of the U.S. forces. 
NSDD 103 completely changed standing ROE, placed responsibility for entering the 
conflict entirely on the shoulders of an on-scene commander, and endangered the 
Marines with retaliation on a scale they were not equipped to handle, not to mention the 
fact that the criteria for engaging in Suq-Al-Gharb were practically impossible for the 
commander to determine on his own.146 NSDD 103 was clearly the moment when the 
United States lost sight of its original mission and made a swift strategic pivot from 
peaceful intervention to forceful interposition. 
On September 17, the U.S. Marines’ commander on the ground, Col. Timothy J. 
Geraghty, ordered naval gunfire support from the U.S. Sixth Fleet ships stationed off 
Lebanon’s coast in response to attacks on BIA.147 On September 19, after giving in to 
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political pressure from Special Negotiator Robert McFarlane and others, Geraghty 
requested that the 16″/50 caliber guns from the United States’ intervention fleet rain fire 
down on Syrian and Soviet armored forces148 in the mountains surrounding Suq Al 
Gharb in order to salvage the wilting LAF. The added firepower prevented a total loss, 
but did not stop the inevitable outcome.149  
C. AFTERMATH 
Contrary to Reagan administration assurances that the strategic and political 
situation was going to improve, it did not. Syria was eventually compelled to accept a 
ceasefire in late September and a brief spark of hope flared for U.S. strategy. That spark 
was snuffed on October 23, 1983, when a suicide car-bomb attack on BIA prematurely 
ended the lives of 241 Marines and rendered ridiculous any remaining sentiment that the 
MNF was not engaged with a hostile adversary.150  
The devastating attack on BIA spurred the U.S. government to fully reexamine its 
posture in the Middle East. President Reagan vowed revenge and declared that the 
Marines’ role in Lebanon was now even more essential to countering Soviet influence.151 
Congress countered by initiating investigations into the bombing at BIA and avoided by 
the narrowest of margins a vote to remove the Marines from Lebanon entirely. A political 
tug of war persisted for nearly a year with no significant progress made in Lebanon 
politically or militarily. By December of 1983, administration leaders began making 
plans to withdraw U.S. forces entirely.152 
Despite increased U.S. firepower and support for the LAF, the GOL and its 
associated armed forces were unable to achieve victory. Under domestic political 
pressure at home, the United States withdrew in February of 1984.153 The best that the 
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Reagan administration could say about the intervention was that it was finally over. 
Lebanon remained a raging sectarian battlefield well into the early 1990s and only began 
to settle its differences after a Saudi-led, Syrian-approved peace agreement was reached 
in 1989.154 Israeli troops fortified in southern Lebanon until the early 2000s and would 
continue to combat terrorist acts in southern Lebanon.155 Syrian occupation forces 
withdrew after UN Resolution 1559 was issued in 2005 calling for their hasty 
extraction.156 The PLO was essentially powerless after Arafat’s evacuation of Beirut and 
has yet to return to levels of pre-1982 prestige.157 No one profited from war in Lebanon, 
excepting Hezbollah, which rose to power in 1983 and remains influential as the only 
authorized armed militia “resistance force” left in Lebanon today.158 
Years after the conflict, American leadership reflected on U.S. mistakes in 
Lebanon. SECDEF Weinberger recalled, “Beirut was an absolutely inevitable outcome of 
doing what we did, of putting troops in with no mission that could be carried out. There 
was no agreement on either side of the pullback. You didn’t need a buffer force. There’s 
nothing more dangerous than in the middle of a furious prizefight, inserting a referee in 
range of both the fighters….That’s what we did.”159 In an interview regarding his time as 
U.S. MNF commander, Colonel Geraghty remarked, “You could just smell that we were 
being set up. It’s the same pattern… and the whole point is that it hasn’t changed.”160  
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The most pointed remarks, however, come from President Reagan: 
Perhaps we didn’t appreciate fully enough the depth of the hatred and the 
complexity of the problems that make the Middle East such a jungle. 
Perhaps the idea of a suicide car bomber committing mass murder to gain 
instant entry to Paradise was so foreign to our own values and 
consciousness that it did not create in us the concern for the marines’ 
safety that it should have. Perhaps we should have anticipated that 
members of the Lebanese military whom we were trying to assist would 
simply lay down their arms and refuse to fight their own countrymen. In 
any case, the sending of the marines to Beirut was the source of my 
greatest regret and my greatest sorrow as president.161   
  
                                                 
161 Ronald Reagan, An American Life: An Enhanced eBook with CBS Video: The Autobiography 
(Simon & Schuster, Kindle Edition, 2011), Kindle Locations 6899–6903. 
 42




IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. POLICY AND STRATEGY PROBLEMS 
U.S. government planners failed to recognize a crucial fact: diplomatically and 
militarily, Egypt and Israel at Camp David in 1979 did not equate to the PLO and Israel 
in Lebanon in 1982. With the Camp David Accords, both parties involved had something 
to trade. Egypt could offer peace in exchange for land, which Israel controlled but was 
prepared to concede because it judged the Egyptian offer to be credible.  
The PLO in Lebanon had nothing to barter with Israel. There was never going to 
be a credible guarantee of peace from Arafat or the other disparate Palestinian leaders—
suggesting that a peace settlement with Israel was possible led to fracturing of the 
PLO.162 To further emphasize the point: Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981, which was 
owed in large part to his having agreed to Camp David, cast no doubt on the continuing 
validity of the deal. Had Yasser Arafat somehow reached a comparable deal with Israel 
and suffered the same fate, most likely, the PLO would have been back to fighting the 
same day. Syrian involvement further complicated any possible peace agreement and 
introduced another variable for consideration in negotiations and strategic gain/loss 
calculations. Lastly, U.S. injection of the Marines in Lebanon did not sufficiently supply 
the tactical leverage required to force any sort of solution. 
It is critical to remark on the nature of the mission given to the peacekeeping 
force. Establishing a presence, or simply basing one’s troops in another’s sovereign 
territory, is a political action undertaken to convey information to the host nation and 
potential (or in this case actual) belligerents.163 For example, the United States based 
thousands of troops in Europe from 1945–1989 to signal the seriousness of America’s 
                                                 
162 Kellerman and Rubin, Leadership and Negotiation, 62. 
163 And is not an official military term for operations. “DOD Dictionary of Military Terms,” accessed 




strategic commitment to the USSR. In this example, thousands of troops in Europe send a 
very clear message to the intended recipient.  
In Lebanon, what message was 1200 Marines supposed to send, and to whom? 
The notion of presence operations in Lebanon was a failure to connect a coherent 
message with the appropriate recipient. Lebanese militants of every description were 
displeased to see foreign military forces sitting in their airport (barring the LAF, perhaps 
the only force involved who had reason to welcome the American presence 
unambiguously). At the same time, the forces fighting knew that eventually the U.S. 
forces would leave. Furthermore, when U.S. actions displayed partiality, vehement 
retaliation was the result. Military commitments can lend conviction to foreign policy, 
but not clarity. On the contrary, their presence adds an additional layer of real and 
symbolic information that policy makers must control. 
Based on the mission Marines were given for entering Lebanon—deter violence, 
compel belligerents to leave, and assist the GOL—it is impossible to suggest that the 
MNF had any hope of accomplishing this. Restrictive ROE and an ambiguous, out of 
context mission statement precluded any hope for gainful employment of the Marines.164 
One could argue that the relative eight- to nine-month calm that followed after the MNF’s 
reentry into Beirut justified their employment, but the inability of the political actors to 
obtain any sort of serious concessions or progress during that lull negates the 
argument.165 As Weinberger, Reagan, and others would later concede, a larger, less 
constrained commitment to Lebanon sooner would have been a more compelling factor 
for negotiations.166 
Setting aside for a moment the fact that the military forces deployed in Lebanon 
were not compatible with the depth of strategic objectives sought, it is imperative to 
reflect on the political situation writ large. The diplomatic agenda of the United States in 
Lebanon was far more complex in scope than the ill-conceived military mission. As a 
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result of President Reagan’s 1 September Peace Proposal, negotiations in Lebanon hoped 
to achieve difficult compromises and the subordinations of disparate national interests in 
the midst of a shifting, little-understood sectarian conflict.167 As a result, U.S. objectives 
hoped to achieve a substantive compromise in Lebanon that was entirely dependent on 
the incalculable will of actors outside of U.S. control, and none of those actors were 
prepared to (or compelled to) accept a U.S. solution. 
After one accepts that Israel, Syria, and Lebanon were not prepared to accept an 
American solution, the rest of the story and the actions of the players involved make 
more sense. Over time, the Lebanese, Syrians, and Israelis came to view U.S. goals for 
Lebanon and the region as contrary to their own. As one researcher states, “U.S. 
diplomacy ultimately foundered on an inability to honestly broker Israeli and Syrian 
interests, not just in Lebanon but also within the context of a regional political-military 
restructuring.”168 The longer the conflict wore on, the more apparent U.S. duplicity 
became and ultimately led to regional consternation at U.S. interference. Time was never 
on America’s side in Lebanon. 
Fortunately, as a result of losses experienced in Lebanon, government leaders 
were prompted to reevaluate when employing military force is appropriate. Known today 
as the Weinberger Doctrine, on November 28, 1984, SECDEF Weinberger outlined six 
guidelines for the use of force when confronted by international situations without clear-
cut military necessity.169 Those six guidelines were as follows:  
1. First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas 
unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our 
national interest or that of our allies…. 
2. Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given 
situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of 
winning…. 
3. Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should 
have clearly defined political and military objectives…. 
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4. Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have 
committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually 
reassessed and adjusted if necessary…. 
5. Fifth, before the U.S. commits forces abroad, there must be some 
reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and 
their elected representatives in Congress…. 
6. Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last 
resort.170 
Weinberger’s tenets represented a new pattern of civil-military relations to follow 
in the wake of the disastrous consequences experienced in Lebanon, and also captured the 
transition of the United States away from “their past use of military force to their future 
use of military power.”171  
B. CONCLUSION 
President Reagan and his team pursued their foreign policies in the Middle East  
in a Cold War context and with the false presumption that domestic strife in the Middle 
East could be appeased with political solutions alongside symbolic military tools. 
Furthermore, as the administration’s policy efforts spiraled into disarray, the 
accompanying military intervention became less and less rational with respect to 
alignment of ends, ways, and means. In the short term, the cost for American intervention 
in Lebanon was paid with the blood of the MNF and millions of dollars in U.S. treasure, 
all of which served to lubricate the axle of the Arab-Israeli war machine that ground the 
American strategy for peace in the Middle East into defeat. Lasting repercussions are still 
felt today. 
There were clearly defined strategic goals for Lebanon; however, they were not 
achievable with the forces and tactics employed. Reagan’s administration made the 
decision to inject American Marines as a neutral peacekeeping force into a schismatic 
domestic conflict without proper strategic consideration about the mission they were 
actually sent to accomplish. While the first intervention was laudable, after the MNF 
returned, ambiguous mission statements and addendums, restrictive ROE, failure to 
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maintain neutrality in the conflict, and failure to recognize the deteriorating situation in 
1983 are some of the factors that illustrate the lack of consideration for the second 
military deployment. If President Reagan’s policy initiatives were successful, history may 
look more kindly on the misguided intervention; sadly, they also failed abysmally. 
The intervention in Lebanon produced none of the results expected by the Reagan 
administration. The Arab-Israeli dispute continues to rage, foreign fighters still occupy 
territory in Lebanon, and Soviet influence in the region remains, though a shadow of 
what it was during the Lebanese conflict. The Reagan Plan for peace in the Middle East 
also failed miserably due to unrealistic perception of the realities of the situation. 
American prestige and credibility was damaged, Israeli-U.S. relations were strained, and 
new extremist groups were fostered; Hezbollah, who formed as a direct result of the 
conflict in Lebanon, is now a household name in the Levant. Most importantly, the 
United States’ role and involvement in the Middle East continues to evolve and the 
situation, now as then, rings with familiar overtones. 
In Lebanon, U.S. forces were required to intervene on behalf of a government that 
did not command the loyalty of its people and could not unravel its own domestic and 
political Gordian knots. Tactically, the ROE governing the application of military force 
failed to reflect the contentious and constantly shifting operational environment. Politico-
military success in Lebanon would have entailed risks and costs that the United States 
was not willing pay—neither the first nor the last time this has been so, and in this 
instance an insight, one can only conclude, that was fully within reach of the policy-
makers at the time. Yet they failed to reach it.  
 48
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 49
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Barrett, Laurence I. Gambling with History. New York: Doubleday, 1983. 
Begin, Menachem. Be Machteret. Tel Aviv: Hadar Publishers, 1978. 
“Beirut: Echoes of 1983 Marine Barracks Bombing in Hassan Attack.” Accessed July 30, 
2014. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/23/beirut-echoes-of-1983-
marine-barracks-bombing-in-hassan-attack.html. 
“Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.” Last modified October 31, 
2013. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977–1980/camp-david. 
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. 
Davis, Thomas M. “Lebanon 1982: The Imbalance of Political Ends and Military 
Means.” Global Security.org. Accessed August 9, 2014. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/DTM.htm. 
———. 40 KM Into Lebanon: Israel’s 1982 Invasion. Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 1985. 
“DOD Dictionary of Military Terms.” Accessed March 15, 2014. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/DOD_dictionary/?zoom_query=presence+operations
&zoom_sort=0&zoom_per_page=10&zoom_and=1. 
Dunn, Michael Collins. “Rebuilding Lebanon’s Army.” Accessed July 16, 2014. 
http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%206–1/Dunn.pdf. 
Gabriel, Richard A. Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israel-PLO War in Lebanon. New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1984. 
Glad, Betty. “The United State’s Ronald Reagan.” In Leadership and Negotiation in the 
Middle East, edited by Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, 200–229. New 
York: Praeger, 1988. 
Hallenbeck, Ralph A. Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: 
Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982–February 1984. New York: Praeger, 1991. 
Harris, William. Lebanon: A History 600–2011. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012. 




“Israel an Interview with Yizhak Rabin.” Accessed August 9, 2014. 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,960283,00.html. 
Johnson, Michael. All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon. Oxford: 
The Center for Lebanese Studies, 2001. 
Khalidi, Rashid. “The PLO’s Yasser Arafat.” In Leadership and Negotiation in the 
Middle East, edited by Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, 49–69. New 
York: Praeger, 1988. 
———. Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking during the 1982 War. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985. 
Kreyem, Hassan. “The Lebanese Civil War and The Taif Agreement.” Accessed October 
10, 2014. http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html. 
Lewis, Martin W. “Greater Syria and the Challenge to Syrian Nationalism.” Accessed 
November 19, 2014. http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/greater-syria-and-
the-challenge-to-syrian-nationalism. 
———. “Geographic Map of Lebanon.” Accessed November 19, 2014. 
http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/greater-syria-and-the-challenge-to-
syrian-nationalism. 
McFarlane, Robert, and Zofia Smardz. Special Trust. New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994. 
Neeman, Yuval. “National Goals.” In On the Difficulty of Being an Israeli, edited by 
Alouf Hareven, 257–74. Jerusalem: The Van Leer Foundation, 1983. 
———. “News Summary: Saturday, June 19, 1982.” Accessed August 3, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/19/nyregion/news-summary-saturday-june-19–
1982.html. 
“NSDD–National Security Decision Directives: Reagan Administration.” Accessed July 
16, 2014. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-103.htm. 
Petallides, Constantine J. “Cedars to the East: A Study of Modern Lebanon.” Accessed 
January 5, 2014. http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/603/cedars-to-the-east-a-
study-of-modern-lebanon. 
Pintak, Lawrence. Seeds of Hate: How America’s Flawed Middle East Policy Ignited the 
Jihad. London: Pluto Press, 2003. 
Reagan, Ronald. An American Life: An Enhanced eBook with CBS Video: The 
Autobiography. New York: Simon & Schuster Kindle Edition, 2011. 
 51
“Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport.” Last modified October 
23, 2011. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982–
1984/DOD-Report/Beirut-1.html. 
Rosen, David M. “Lebanon’s Elias Sarkis, Bashir Gemayel, and Amin Gemayel.” In 
Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East, edited by Barbara Kellerman and 
Jeffrey Z. Rubin, 14–29. New York: Praeger, 1988. 
Rosenfeld, Stephen S. “The Conduct of American Foreign Policy: Testing the Hard 
Line.” Foreign Affairs, February 1, 1983. Accessed August 9, 2014. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/37139/stephen-s-rosenfeld/the-conduct-of-
american-foreign-policy-testing-the-hard-line. 
“Security Council Declares Support for Free, Fair Presidential Election in Lebanon; Calls 
for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces There.” Accessed November 10, 2014. 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sc8181.doc.htm. 
Schultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Time as Secretary of State. New York: 
Charles Scribner & Sons, 1993. 
Seliktar, Ofira. “Israel’s Menachem Begin.” In Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle 
East, edited by Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, 30–48. New York: 
Praeger, 1988. 
———. New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System of Israel. London and Sidney: 
Croom Helm, 1986. 
Soussi, Alasdair. “Legacy of U.S.’ 1958 Lebanon Invasion.” Accessed November 15, 
2014. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/07/201371411160525538.html. 
Strober, Gerald, and Deborah Hart Strober. Reagan: The Man and His Presidency. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998. 
Sylvan, David, and Stephen Majeski. U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective: Clients, 
Enemies, and Empires. London: Routledge, 2009. 
———. Accompanying Notes website for U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective: Clients, 
Enemies, and Empires. http://www.us-foreign-policy-
perspective.org/index.php?id=311&L=-1%2527. 
“U.S. Multinational Force [USMNF] Lebanon.” Last modified May 7, 2011. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/usmnf.htm. 
“The Use of Military Force.” Accessed March 15, 2014. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/weinberger.html. 
 52
Weinberger, Naomi Joy. Syrian Intervention in Lebanon. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986. 
Winslow, Charles. Lebanon: War & Politics in a Fragmented Society. London: 
Routledge, 1996. 
Yoshitani, Gail E. S. Reagan on War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 1980–










INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
